The Final Programme figures
Here are what are supposed to be the final figures for the Cyprus bailout pgoramme. These rose dramatically between the first draft of the Assessment of Financial Needs of 25th March and the 9th April version. The total programme figure increased from €18 to €24bn.
These figures were not strictly comparable as came to light through Ollie Rehn's comments about comparing apples, pears and organges (see previous blogs below).
The final 12th April gross programme figure is now €21.5bn against the original of March 25th of €18bn. This is still a marked increase and reflects the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in part created by the bungled bailout.
The major difference in the April 9th and 12th positions was accounted for by the reduced estimate of bail-in needs from depositors at Laiki and Bank of Cyprus (for more detail of changes see the notes under the table and Peter Spiegel's Brussels Blog in the FT that brought the 'final' figures to light).
There are still inconsistencies in the 'final' Financial Needs Assessment' document.
For example, the bank bail-in figure in the text of the document is given as €8.3bn but in the detailed table in Annex 1 the 'Debt-equity-swap' figure is given as €10.3bn.
Spiegel reports that in a walk-through of the figures above with an EU official it became apparent that initial confusion arose because the bank bond default imposed on junior bondholders was not included in the initial programme figures.
Burden sharing revisited
It should of course be noted that with with these revised figures the burden sharing between the EU/IMF and Cyprus has changed to Cyprus's disadvantage both absolutely and relatively. The total amount of the programme carried by Cyprus has risen from €8bn in late March 2013 to €11.4bn in early April 2013 and the percentage of the programme carried by Cyprus has risen from 44.4% to 53%. The EU/IMF programme share amount has remained constant at €10bn while the percentage of the pgoramme this carries has fallen from 55.6% to 47%.
Links to the final versions of the documents posted on the Dutch Finance Ministry website can be found here (Memorandum) at top of page.
Table 1: Cyprus bailout programme finance needs from the Assessment of Financing Needs Document
|
€bn |
ESM/IMF |
Cyprus March 25th |
Cyprus April 9 |
Cyprus April 12 |
|
Bank Recapitalisation |
2.5 |
5.8 |
10.6 |
8.3 |
|
Increased Taxes |
|
1.0 |
0.6 |
0 |
|
Gold Sales |
|
|
0.4 |
0.4 |
|
Debt rollover |
|
|
1.0 |
1.0 |
|
Privatisations to 2018 |
|
|
1.4 |
0.5 |
|
Default on bank bonds |
|
1.2 |
|
1.2 |
|
Restructuring Russian Fed debt |
|
|
0.1 |
0.1 |
|
Medium-Long Term Debt |
4.1 |
|
|
|
|
Fiscal Needs |
3.4 |
|
|
|
|
Programme Total (gross) |
|
18 |
24.1 |
21.5 |
|
Burden Sharing (CY amount) |
|
8 |
- |
11.4 |
|
Burden Sharing (CY % total) |
|
44.4% |
- |
53% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes to Table 1 above
The April 12 total is exaggerated because privatisations includes receipts that will be received after the programme period.
The default on bank bonds was never included in the Assessment of Financial Needs document but it has been counted by EU officials as part of the programme gross cost.
The April 12 version of the Assessment of Financial Needs makes no mention of increased taxes that figures in the original and April 9th versions of the document - why?
My programme total of €21.5 differs from Peter Spiegel's total of €21.4 in his blog link above because I have included the 'Restructuring Reussian Debt' figure - that appears in the text but not in Annex 1. Note 3 in the text is ambiguous.
The bank bailout figure for Laiki/BofC has been reduced from €10.6 to €8.3bn due to reworking estimates of the financing needs of the banks.
The April 12 figure is still €3.4 or 3.5bn above the original estimates of the programme cost.
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